Abstract: Given a bounded C 2 domain G ⊂ R m and functions g ∈ C(∂G, R) and h ∈ C(Ḡ, R \ {0}), let u denote the unique viscosity solution to the equation −2∆∞u = h in G with boundary data g. We provide a representation for u as the value of a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game.
1. Introduction
Infinity-Laplacian and games
For an integer m ≥ 2 let a bounded C 2 domain G ⊂ R m , and functions g ∈ C(∂G, R) and h ∈ C(Ḡ, R\{0}) be given. We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG), defined in terms of an m-dimensional state process that is driven by a one-dimensional Brownian motion, played until the state exits the domain. The functions g and h serve as terminal, and, respectively, running payoffs. The players' controls enter in a diffusion coefficient and in an unbounded drift coefficient of the state process. The dynamics are degenerate in that it is possible for the players to completely switch off the Brownian motion. We show that the game has value, and characterize the value function as the unique viscosity solution u (uniqueness of solutions is known from [9] ) of the equation
(1.1)
Here ∆ ∞ is the infinity-Laplacian defined as ∆ ∞ f = (Df ) ′ (D 2 f )(Df )/|Df | 2 , provided Df = 0, where for a C 2 function f we denote by Df the gradient and by D 2 f the Hessian matrix.
Our work is motivated by a representation for u of Peres et. al. [9] (established in fact in a far greater generality), as the limit, as ε → 0, of the value function V ε of a discrete time random turn game, referred to as Tug-of-War, in which ε is a parameter. The contribution of the current work is the identification of a game for which the value function is precisely equal to u.
The infinity-Laplacian was first considered by Aronsson [1] in the study of absolutely minimal (AM) extensions of Lipschitz functions. Given a Lipschitz function u defined on the boundary ∂G of a domain G, a Lipschitz function u extending u toḠ is called an AM extension of u if, for every open U ⊂ G, LipŪ u = Lip ∂U u, where for a real function f defined on F ⊂ R m , Lip F f = sup x,y∈F,x =y |f (x) − f (y)|/|x − y|. It was shown in [1] that a Lipschitz function u onḠ that is C 2 on G is an AM extension of u| ∂G if and only if u is infinity-harmonic, namely satisfies ∆ ∞ u = 0 in G. This connection enables in some cases to prove uniqueness of AM extensions via PDE tools. However, due to the degeneracy of this elliptic equation, classical PDE approach in general is not applicable. Jensen [7] showed that an appropriate framework is through the theory of viscosity solutions, by establishing existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions to the homogeneous version (h = 0) of (1.1), and showing that if g is Lipschitz then the solution is an AM extension of g. In addition to the relation to AM extensions, the infinity-Laplacian arises in a variety of other situations [3] . Some examples include models for sand-pile evolution [2] , motion by mean curvature, and stochastic target problems [8] , [10] .
We do not treat the homogenous equation for reasons mentioned later in this section. The inhomogeneous equation may admit multiple solutions when h assumes both signs [9] . Our assumption on h implies that either h > 0 or h < 0. Uniqueness for the case where these strict inequalities are replaced with weak inequalities is unknown [9] . Thus the assumption we make on h is the minimal one under which uniqueness is known to hold in general (except the case h = 0).
Let us describe the Tug-of-War game introduced in [9] . Fix ε > 0. Let a token be placed at x ∈ G, and set X 0 = x. At the k-th step of the game (k ≥ 1), an independent toss of a fair coin determines which player takes the turn. The selected player is allowed to move the token from its current position X k−1 ∈ G to a new position X k inḠ, in such a way that |X k − X k−1 | ≤ ε ( [9] requires |X k − X k−1 | < ε but this is an equivalent formulation in the setting described here). The game ends at the first time K when X K ∈ ∂G. The associated payoff is given by
Player I attempts to maximize the payoff and Player II's goal is to minimize it. It is shown in [9] that the value of the game, defined in a standard way and denoted V ε (x), exists, that V ε converges uniformly to a function V referred to as the "continuum value function", and that V is the unique viscosity solution of (1.1) (these results are in fact also proved for the homogeneous case, and in generality greater than the scope of the current paper). The question of associating a game directly with the continuum value was posed and some basic technical challenges associated with it were discussed in [9] .
Our approach to the question above is via a SDG formulation. To motivate the form of the SDG we start with the Tug-of-War game and present some formal calculations (a precise definition of the SDG will appear later). Let {ξ k , k ∈ N} be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables on some probability space (Ω, F, P ) with P (ξ k = 1) = P (ξ k = −1) = 1/2, interpreted as the sequence of coin tosses. Let {F k } k≥0 be a filtration of F to which {ξ k } is adapted and such that {ξ k+1 , ξ k+2 . . .} is independent of F k for every k ≥ 0. Let {a k }, {b k } be {F k }-predictable sequences of random variables with values in B ε (0) = {x ∈ R m : |x| ≤ ε}. These sequences correspond to control actions of Player I and II; that is, a k [resp., b k ] is the displacement exercised by Player I [resp., Player II] if it wins the k-th coin toss. Associating the event {ξ k = 1} with Player I winning the k-th toss, one can write the following representation for the position of the token, starting from initial state x. For j ∈ N,
We shall refer to {X j } as the 'state process'. This representation, in which turns are not taken at random but both players select an action at each step, and the noise enters in the dynamics, is more convenient for the development that follows. Let ε = 1/ √ n and rescale the control processes by defining, for t ≥ 0, A n t = √ n a [nt] , B n t = √ n b [nt] . Consider the continuous time state process X n t = X [nt] , and define {W n t } t≥0 by setting W n 0 = 0 and using the relation
Then we have X
Note that W n converges weakly to a standard Brownian motion, and since |A n t | ∨ |B n t | ≤ 1, the second term on the right hand side of (1.3) forms a tight sequence. Thus it is easy to guess a substitute for it in the continuous game. Interpretation of the asymptotics of the third term is more subtle, and is a key element of the formulation. One possible approach is to replace the factor √ n by a large quantity that is dynamically controlled by the two players. This point of view motivates one to consider the identity (Proposition 5.1) 4) for the following reason. Let H = S m−1 × [0, ∞) where S m−1 is the unit sphere in R m . The expression in curly brackets is equal to L a,b,c,d f (x), where for (a, c),
is the controlled generator associated with the process 
, where τ = inf{t : X t / ∈ G} (with an appropriate convention regarding τ = ∞).
A precise formulation of this game is given in Section 1.2, along with a statement of the main result. Section 1.3 discusses the technique and some open problems.
Throughout, we will denote by S(m) the space of symmetric m × m matrices, and by I m ∈ S(m) the identity matrix. A function ϑ : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) will be said to be a modulus if it is continuous, nondecreasing, and satisfies ϑ(0) = 0.
SDG formulation and main result
Recall that G is a bounded C 2 domain in R m , and that g : ∂G → R and h : G → R \ {0} are given continuous functions. In particular we have that either h > 0 or h < 0. Since the two cases are similar, we will only consider h > 0, and use the notation h := inf G h > 0. Let (Ω, F, {F t }, P ) be a complete filtered probability space with right-continuous filtration, supporting an (m + 1)-dimensional {F t }-Brownian motion W = (W, W ), where W and W are 1-and m-dimensional Brownian motions, respectively (in Section 1.3 we comment on the need for the auxiliary Brownian motion W ). Let E denote expectation with respect to P . Let X t be a process taking values in R m , given by 6) where x ∈ G, A t and B t take values in the unit sphere S m−1 ⊂ R m , and C t and D t take values in [0, ∞).
The processes Y 0 and Z 0 take values in H = S m−1 × [0, ∞). These processes will correspond to control actions of the maximizing and minimizing player, respectively. Let
Throughout we will follow the convention that the infimum over an empty set is ∞. We write
for the process X [resp., the random time τ ] when it is important to specify the explicit dependence on (x, Y 0 , Z 0 ). If τ < ∞ a.s., then the payoff J(x, Y 0 , Z 0 ) is well defined with values in (−∞, ∞], where and X is given by (1.6). When P (τ (x, Y 0 , Z 0 ) = ∞) > 0, we set J(x, Y 0 , Z 0 ) = ∞, in agreement with the expectation of the first term in (1.9).
We turn to the precise definition of the SDG. For a process H 0 = (A, C) taking values in H we let S(H 0 ) = ess sup sup t∈[0,∞) C t . In the formulation below, each player initially declares a bound S, and then plays so as to keep S(H 0 ) ≤ S.
, where S ∈ N and {H 0 t } is a process taking values in H, is said to be an admissible control if {H 0 t } is {F t }-progressively measurable, and S(H 0 ) ≤ S. The set of all admissible controls is denoted by M . For H = ({H 0 t }, S) ∈ M , denote S(H) = S. (ii) A mapping ̺ : M → M is said to be a strategy if, for every t,
The set of all strategies is denoted by Γ .
and
A continuous function u : G → R is said to be a viscosity supersolution [resp., subsolution] of (1.1), if (i) for every x ∈ G and ϕ ∈ C 2 (G) for which (p, Σ) := (Dϕ(x), D 2 ϕ(x)) ∈ D, and u − ϕ has a global minimum [maximum] on G at x, one has
A viscosity solution is a function which is both a super-and a subsolution.
The following is the main result. In what follows we use the terms subsolution, supersolution and solution as shorthand for viscosity subsolution, etc.
Discussion
We describe here our approach to proving the main result, and mention some obstacles in extending it.
A common approach to showing solvability of Bellman-Isaacs (BI) equations ((1.1) can be viewed as such an equation due to (1.4)) by the associated value function, is by proving that the value function satisfies a dynamic programming principle (DPP). Roughly speaking, this is an equation expressing the fact that, rather than attempting to maximize their profit by considering directly the payoff functional, the players may consider the payoff incurred up to a time t plus the value function evaluated at the position X t that the state reaches at that time. Although in a single player setting (i.e. in pure control problems) DPP are well understood, game theoretic settings as in this paper are significantly harder. In particular, as we shall shortly point out, there are some basic open problems related to such DPP. In a setting with a finite time horizon, Fleming and Souganidis [6] established a DPP based on careful discretization and approximation arguments. We have been unable to carry out a similar proof in the current setting, which includes a payoff given in terms of an exit time, degenerate diffusion and unbounded controls.
Swiech [11] has developed an alternative approach to the above problem that relies on existence of solutions. Instead of establishing a DPP for the value function, the idea of [11] is to show that any solution must satisfy a DPP. To see what is meant by such a DPP and how it is used, consider the equation, −2∆ ∞ u + λu = h in G, u = g on ∂G, where λ ≥ 0 is a constant, associated with the payoff in (1.9) modified by a discount factor. Assume that one can show that whenever u and v are sub-and supersolutions, respectively, then
, Z] and σ = σ(t) = τ ∧ t. Sending t → ∞ in the above equations, one would formally obtain
in particular yielding that if u = v is a solution to the equation then it must equal the upper value function. This would establish unique solvability of the equation by the upper value function, provided there exists a solution. In the case λ > 0, justifying the above formal limit is straightforward (see [11] ) but the case λ = 0, as in our setting, requires a more careful argument. Our proofs exploit the uniform positivity of h due to which the minimizing player will not allow τ to be too large. This leads to uniform estimates on the decay of P (τ > t) as t → ∞, from which an inequality as in (1.15) follows readily. This discussion also explains why we are unable to treat the case h = 0.
Establishing DPP as in (1.13), (1.14) is thus a key ingredient in this approach. For a class of BI equations, defined on all of R m , for which the associated game has a bounded action set and a fixed, finite time horizon, such a DPP was proved in Swiech [11] . In the current paper, although we do not establish (1.13), (1.14) in the above form, we derive similar inequalities (for λ = 0) for a related bounded action game, defined on G. The characterization of the value function for the original unbounded action game is then treated by taking suitable limits.
Both [6] and [11] require some assumptions on the sample space and underlying filtration. In [6] the underlying filtration is the one generated by the driving Brownian motion. The approach taken in [11] , which the current paper follows, allows for a general filtration as long as it is rich enough to support an m-dimensional Brownian motion, independent of the Brownian motion driving the state process. The reason for imposing this requirement in [11] is that inequalities similar to (1.13) and (1.14) are proved by first establishing them for a game associated with a non-degenerate elliptic equation, and then taking a vanishing viscosity limit. This technical issue is the reason for including the auxiliary process W in our formulation as well. As pointed out in [11] , the question of validity of the DPP and the characterization of the value as the imsart-generic ver. 2006/09/07 file: main.tex date: August 11, 2008 unique solution to the PDE, under an arbitrary filtration, remains a basic open problem on SDGs.
Both the unboundedness of the action space and the combination of degeneracy of the dynamics and an exit time criterion make it hard to adapt the results of [11] to our setting. In order to overcome the first difficulty we approximate the original SDG by a sequence of games with bounded action spaces, that are more readily analyzed. For the bounded action game, existence of solutions to the upper and lower BI equations follow from [4] . We show that the solutions to these equations satisfy a DPP similar to (1.13)-(1.14) (Proposition 4.1). As discussed above, existence of solutions along with the DPP yields the characterization of these solutions as the corresponding value functions. Next, as we show in Lemma 2.5, the upper and lower value functions for the bounded action games approach the corresponding value functions of the original game, pointwise, as the bounds approach ∞. Moreover, in Lemma 2.4 we show that any uniform subsequential limit, as the bounds approach ∞, of solutions to the BI equation for bounded action games is a viscosity solution of (1.1). The last piece in the proof of the main result is then showing existence of uniform (subsequential) limits. This is established in Theorem 2.1 by proving equicontinuity, in the parameters governing the bounds, of the value functions for bounded action games. The proof of equicontinuity is the most technical part of this paper and the main place where the C 2 assumption on the domain is used. This is also the place where the possibility of degenerate dynamics close to the exit time needs to be carefully analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we prove Theorem 1.1 based on results on BI equations for bounded action SDG. These results are established in Sections 3 (equicontinuity of the value functions) and 4 (relating the value function to the PDE). Finally, it is natural to ask whether the state process, obtained under δ-optimal play by both players, converges in law as δ tends to zero. Section 5 contains a discussion on this issue.
Relation to Bellman-Isaacs equation
In this section we prove Theorem 1.1 by relating the value functions U and V to value functions of SDG with bounded action sets, and similarly, the solution to (1.1) to that of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equations.
Let p ∈ R m , p = 0 and S ∈ S(m) be given, and, for n ∈ N, fix p n ∈ R m , p n = 0 and S n ∈ S(m), such that p n → p, S n → S. Denotep = p/|p| andp n = p n /|p n |. Let {k n } and {l n } be positive, increasing sequences such that k n → ∞, l n → ∞.
and let Λ 
Proof. We prove only the statement regarding Λ − n , since the other statement can be proved analogously. We omit the superscript '−' from the notation. Denote
, which is bounded from above as n → ∞, since (b +p n ) ·p n ≥ 0 for all b ∈ S m−1 , n ≥ 1. On the other hand, if for some fixed ε > 0, a * n · p n < |p n | − ε holds for infinitely many n, then lim supΛ n (a * n , c n ) = ∞ for any choice of c n contradicting the statement that Λ * n is bounded from above. This shows, for every ε > 0,
for all large n. In particular, a * n →p. Next note that
If b n → −p does not hold then lim inf Λ * n = −∞ by the first line of (2.4) which contradicts the previous display. This shows b n → −p. Hence from the second line of (2.4)
We now consider two formulations of SDG with bounded controls, the first being based on Definition 1.1 whereas the second is more standard. For k, l ∈ N let
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and the upper value
Definition 2.1. (i) A process {H t } taking values in H is said to be a simple admissible control if it is {F t }-progressively measurable. We denote by M 0 the set of all simple admissible controls, and let
l is a simple strategy, and write ̺ ∈ Γ 0 kl if, for every t,
The following shows that the two formulations are equivalent.
Proof. We only show the claim regarding
Denote V n = V knln and U n = U knln . The following result is proved in Section 3.
Theorem 2.1. For some n 0 ∈ N, the family {V n ; n ≥ n 0 } is equicontinuous, and so is the family {U n ; n ≥ n 0 }. Consider the Bellman-Isaacs equations for the upper and, respectively, lower values of the game with bounded controls, namely
(2.9)
(2.10)
Solutions to these equations are defined analogously to Definition 1.2, with Λ ± n replacing Λ, and where there is no restriction on the derivatives of the test function, i.e., D is replaced with R m × S(m).
Lemma 2.3. There exists n 1 ∈ N such that for each n ≥ n 1 , U n is the unique solution to (2.9), and V n is the unique solution to (2.10).
Proof. This follows from a more general result, Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.
Lemma 2.4. Any subsequential uniform limit of U n or V n is a solution of (1.1).
Proof. Denote by U 0 [resp., V 0 ] a subsequential limit of U n [V n ]. By relabeling, we assume without loss that U n [resp., V n ] converges to U 0 [V 0 ]. We will show that U 0 and V 0 are subsolutions of (1.1). The proof that these are supersolutions is parallel.
We start with the proof that U 0 is a subsolution. Fix x 0 ∈ G. Let ϕ ∈ C 2 (G) be such that U 0 − ϕ is strictly maximized at x 0 . Assume first that Dϕ(x 0 ) = 0. Since U n → U 0 uniformly, we can find {x n } ⊂ G, x n → x 0 , where x n is a local maximum of U n − ϕ for n ≥ N . We take N to be larger than n 1 of Lemma 2.3. Since by Lemma 2.3 U n is a subsolution of (2.9), we have that for n ≥ N Λ
Thus by Lemma 2.1,
Next, assume that Dϕ(x 0 ) = 0 and
Consider the case λ ≥ 0. Fix δ > 0 and let ψ δ (x) = λ+δ 2 |x − x 0 | 2 . Then U 0 − ψ δ has a strict maximum at x 0 . Since U n → U 0 uniformly, we can find {x n } ⊂ G, x n → x 0 , where x n is a local maximum of U n − ψ δ . To prove (2.11) it suffices to show that for each ε > 0, To prove (2.12), argue by contradiction and assume that it fails. Then there exists ε > 0 such that
Let N ≥ n 1 be such that |x n − x 0 | < ε for all n ≥ N . Since U n is a subsolution of (2.9),
Also,
where
and arbitrary otherwise. Thus by (2.13),
However, this contradicts (2.14). Hence (2.12) holds and so (2.11) follows.
Consider now the case λ < 0. Let δ > 0 be such that λ + δ < 0. Let ψ δ be as above. Then U 0 − ψ δ has a strict maximum at x 0 . Fix ε > 0. Then one can find γ < ε such that
Thus one can find η ∈ R m such that 0 < |η| < γ and
Suppose the claim holds. Then Dψ δ,η (x η ) = 0, and so from the first part of the proof,
Since |x η − x 0 | ≤ γ < ε, sending ε → 0 and then δ → 0 yields (2.11).
We now prove (2.19). From (2.18) and the fact that λ + δ < 0,
where we used (2.17) and the negativity of the functions ψ δ and ψ δ,η . This shows that x η = x 0 − η, and (2.19) follows. This completes the proof that U 0 is a subsolution of (1.1).
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where (a n , c n ) achieves the minimum, and then by choosing (b, d) = (−a n , 0),
Hence (2.16) is still true. Rest of the argument for the subsolution property of V 0 follows as that for U 0 .
Similar statements hold for U n (x) and U (x).
Proof. We prove (i) and (ii). The statements regarding U n (x) and U (x) are proved analogously.
for all l sufficiently large. This shows V (x) ≥ lim sup l→∞ V kl (x), and (i) follows.
(
where we define M 0 to be the empty set. Then β l ∈ Γ l . Since M = k≥1 M k , we have that the following holds provided that k is sufficiently large
where the last inequality follows from (2.20) . This shows that, for every l,
The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. The statement that U and V are solutions of (1.1) follows from Theorem 2.1, Lemmas 2.3, 2.4 and uniqueness of solutions of (1.1), established in [9] . The latter result also yields U = V .
Equicontinuity
In this section we prove Theorem 2.1. With an eye towards estimates needed in Section 4 we will consider a somewhat more general setting. Thanks to Lemma 2.2 we may, and will use the value functions (2.7), (2.8), defined using simple controls and strategies (Definition 2.1). Given X defined as in (1.6) for some Y, Z ∈ M 0 , we let for γ ∈ [0, 1), X γ = X + γ W . Define τ γ and J γ as below (1.7) but with X replaced with X γ . Also denote by U γ kl and V γ kl the expressions in (2.7), (2.8) with J replaced with J γ . We write
1 is an immediate consequence of the following more general result.
Theorem 3.1. For some n 2 ∈ N, the family {V γ n , U γ n ; n ≥ n 2 , γ ∈ [0, 1)} is equicontinuous.
In what follows, we will suppress γ from the notation unless there is a scope for confusion. We start by showing that the value functions are uniformly bounded. To this end, fix a 0 ∈ S m−1 , and note that the constant process Y 0 := (a 0 , 1) is in M 0 .
Lemma 3.1. There exists a constant c 1 < ∞ such that
Proof. We only present the proof for the case γ = 0. The general case follows upon minor modifications. Denote by m 0 the diameter of G. Fix T > m 0 . By (1.6), with α t = a 0 · B t , on the event τ > T one has
We now consider the event {τ > T ; M T ≥ T }. One can find m 2 , m 3 ∈ (0, ∞) such that for all non decreasing, non negative processes {γ t }, 
For u ≥ 0, let S u = inf{s : M s > u}. Then, withγ s = γ Ss ,
where the last inequality follows from (3.2). The result now follows on combining the above display with (3.1)
The idea of the proof of equicontinuity, explained in a heuristic manner, is as follows. Let x 1 and x 2 be in G, let ε = |x 1 − x 2 |, and let δ > 0. Consider the game with bounded controls for which V n is the lower value function, for some n ∈ N. Let the minimizing player select a strategy β n that is δ-optimal for the initial position
Denote the exit time by τ 1 = τ x 1 (Y, β n ) and the exit position by ξ 1 = X x 1 (τ 1 ). Now, modify the strategy is such a way that the resulting control Z = β n [Y ] is only affected for times t ≥ τ 1 . This way, the payoff incurred remains unchanged. Thus, denoting the modified strategy by β n , we have, for every Y ∈ M 0 kn ,
Given a point ξ 2 located inside G, ε away from ξ 1 , and a new state process which, at time τ 1 is located at ξ 2 , the modified strategy attempts to force this process to exit the domain soon after τ 1 and with a small displacement from ξ 2 (provided that ε is small).
Let now the maximizing player select a control Y n that is δ-optimal for playing against β n , when starting from x 2 . This control is modified after the exit time τ x 2 (Y n ,β n ) in a similar manner to the above. Denoting the modified control by Y n , we have
One can thus estimate the modulus of continuity of V n by analyzing the payoff incurred when ( Y n , β n ) is played, considering simultaneously two state processes, starting from x 1 and x 2 . The form (1.6) of the dynamics ensures that the processes remain at relative position x 1 − x 2 until, at time σ, one of them leaves the domain. The difference between the running payoffs incurred up to that time can be estimated in terms of ε, the modulus of continuity of h, and the expectation of σ. It is not hard to see that the latter is uniformly bounded, owing to Corollary 3.1 and the boundedness of h away from zero. By construction, one of the players will now attempt to force the state process that is still in G to exit. If one can ensure that exit occurs soon after σ and with a imsart-generic ver. 2006/09/07 file: main.tex date: August 11, 2008 small displacement (uniformly in n), then the running payoff incurred between time σ and the exit time is small, and the difference between the terminal payoffs is bounded in terms of ε and the modulus of continuity of g, resulting in an estimate that is uniform in n.
This argument is made precise in the proof of the theorem. Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 provide the main tools for showing that starting at a state near the boundary, each player may force exit within a short time and with a small displacement. To state these lemmas we first need to introduce some notation.
We have assumed that G is a bounded C 2 domain in R m . Thus there existρ ∈ (0,
. . , k, such that, with B j = Bρ(z j ), j = 1 . . . , k, one has ∂G ⊂ ∪ k j=1 B j , and
Here O(m) is the space of m × m orthonormal matrices. Define for j = 1, . . . , k, ϕ j :
Let j : ∂G → {1, . . . , k} be a measurable map with the property
For existence of such a map see, for example, Theorem 10.1 of [5] . Then, for every ε ≤ ρ 1 :=
For j = 1, . . . , k and x 0 ∈ B j , define ψ
Also, note that |Dψ
such that it is Lipschitz, and
Given a strategy β, and a point x 2 , we seek a control Y = (A, C) that forces a state process starting from x 2 to exit in a short time and with a small displacement from x 2 (provided imsart-generic ver. 2006/09/07 file: main.tex date: August 11, 2008 that x 2 is close to the boundary). We would like to determine Y via the functions π j just constructed, in such a way that the following relation holds:
where π = π x 2 j(x 1 ) and c 0 > 0 is some constant. Making A be oriented in the negative direction of the gradient of ϕ j allows us to show that the state is 'pushed' towards the boundary. The inclusion of a quadratic term in ψ x 0 j ensures in addition that the sub-level sets {ψ j < a} are contained in a small vicinity of x 0 , provided smallness of a and dist(x 0 , ∂G). The latter property enables us to show that the process does not wander a long way along the boundary before exiting.
The difficulty we encounter is that due to the feedback nature of A in (3.5) we cannot ensure (local) existence of solutions of the set of equations (1.6) and (3.5). Take for example a strategy β that is given as
, where b is some measurable map from H to H. Along with equation (1.6), and (3.5) this defines X as a solution to an SDE with general measurable coefficients. However, as is well known, the SDE may not admit any solution in this generality. To overcome this problem we will construct a Y that approximates the Y we seek in (3.5) via a time discretization.
Let Σ ε denote the collection of all quintuples σ = (σ, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , β, Y ) such that σ is an a.s. finite F t stopping time, ξ 1 and ξ 2 are F σ -measurable random variables satisfying (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) ∈ X ε a.s., β ∈ Γ 0 , and Y ∈ M 0 . Fix γ ∈ [0, 1).
We define a sequence of processes (
t ) be given by
The constant c 0 above will be chosen later. Denote (
The process X (0) can be defined arbitrarily for t < σ. Set η 0 = σ. We now define recursively, for all i ≥ 1,
It is easy to check that η 0 < η 1 < · · · and
where a 0 is as fixed at the beginning of the section. Let
We writeX
Note that ifτ ρ andτ G are defined by (3.8) upon replacing X byX thenτ :=τ ρ ∧τ G = τ ρ ∧τ G = τ , becauseX differs from X only after time τ . We writeτ =τ [σ, ξ 1 , ξ 2 , β, Y ]. Similar notation will be used forτ ρ andτ G .
Lemma 3.2.
There exists a c 0 ∈ (0, ∞) and a modulus ϑ such that for every ε ∈ (0, ρ 1 ), and Proof of the lemma is provided after the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Next we construct a strategy β * ∈ Γ 0 with analogous properties. Here, existence of solutions is not an issue, and discretization is not needed.
j , and Π = π
where d 0 is a constant to be determined later. Let
Define τ * ρ , τ * G and τ * by replacing X with X * in (3.9), and note that τ * = τ . To make the dependence explicit we write
Lemma 3.3. There exists d 0 ∈ (0, ∞) and a modulus ϑ such that for all ε ∈ (0,
The proof of Lemma 3.3 is very similar to (in fact somewhat simpler than) the proof of Lemma 3.2 and therefore will be omitted.
If σ is an a.s. finite {F t }-stopping time and (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) are F σ -measurable random variables such that (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) ∈ X ρ 1 a.s., then we define the G t = F t+σ adapted processes where
To make the dependence explicit, writeX
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Fix x 1 , x 2 ∈ G and γ ∈ [0, 1). We will suppress γ from the notation. Assume that |x 1 − x 2 | = ε < ρ 1 , so that Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 are in force. Let n 0 be large enough so that l n , k n ≥ max{c 0 , d 0 } for all n ≥ n 0 . Given δ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ n 0 , let β n ∈ Γ 0 knln be such that sup
hence for every n and every Y ∈ M 0 kn ,
where m 1 < ∞ is a constant that does not depend on n.
Define β n ∈ Γ 0 knln as follows. For Y ∈ M 0 , let
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Let τ 2,n = τ x 2 (Y n , β n ), and X 2,n = X x 2 (Y n , β n ). Let
For m 0 ≥ 0 let ϑ g (m 0 ) = sup{|g(x) − g(y)| : x, y ∈ ∂G, |x − y| ≤ m 0 } and ϑ h (m 0 ) = sup{|h(x) − h(y)| : x, y ∈ G, |x − y| ≤ m 0 }. Using (3.10), the r.h.s. of (3.11) can be bounded by
On the set σ 1,n ≤ σ 2,n we have
for some modulus ϑ 1 . Using Lemma 3.2(ii), a similar estimate holds on the complement set, and consequently, the first term of (3.12) is bounded by ϑ 2 (ε), for some modulus ϑ 2 . By Lemmas 3.2(i) and 3.3(i), the last term of (3.12) is bounded by |h| ∞ (ϑ(ε) + ϑ(ε)). Hence
for some modulus ϑ 3 , and the equicontinuity of {V γ n ; n, γ} follows on sending δ → 0. The proof of equicontinuity of {U γ n ; n, γ} is similar, and therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We will only present the proof for the case γ = 0. The general case follows upon minor modifications. Denote and let ϕ 1,∞ , ϕ 2,∞ be defined analogously. Let ε > 0 and σ ≡ (σ,
where we recall that j * = j(ξ 1 ). We haveτ ≡τ ρ ∧τ G ≤τ ρ ∧τ 0 , because Ψ ≥ Φ. Also, by (3.3), τ ≤τ B . By Ito's formula, for t > σ,
For t ≤τ , using (3.4) and (3.7),
, recalling the definition ofĀ and the fact |DΨ (X s )| ≥ 1/2, we see that
where, by (3.6), for σ ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤τ
Finally, we can estimate
by |p s | ≤ 2ψ 2,∞ . Shifting time by σ, we denote G t = F t+σ ,W t = W t+σ − W σ , and
Denote also m t = |DΨ (X s )|, let M be the G t -martingale
and set 
Combining the above estimates, we have for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤τ − σ,
where r = 2ψ 2,∞ + 1. Note that m t ≥ 1/2 for s ≤τ B − σ, and recall thatτ B ≥τ ≡τ ρ ∧τ G . We have for t ≤τ − σ, assuming without loss of generality 4εψ 2,∞ < 1/32,
Hence for t ≤τ − σ, we have r ≤ 3rm 2 t (1 −α t −δ t ) 2 + 8rm t (1 +α t ). Thus by (3.14), if c 0 is chosen larger than 8r, we have
Q 0 = 0, and
We will write P for P [ · |G 0 ], and E for the respective conditional expectation.
The proof will proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For some ν 1 ∈ (0, ∞)
Step 2. For some ν 2 ∈ (0, ∞)
Note that
Step 2 is immediate from Step 1 and Lemma 3.1 because by construction, a constant control is used after timeτ .
Step 3. There exists a modulus ϑ 1 such that
Step 4. There exists a modulus ϑ 2 such that
Based on these steps, Part (i) of the lemma is established as follows. Writing E ε for the eventτ G − σ > ϑ 1 (ε),
where the first inequality uses Cauchy-Schwartz, and the second uses Steps 2, 3 and 4.
To show Part (ii) of the lemma, use Steps 3 and 4 to write
By (3.14) and (3.15) we can estimate
Thus noting that Φ(X t ) ≥ 0 on {τ ρ >τ G ; t ∈ [σ,τ G ]}, we have on this set,
Part (ii) of the lemma now follows on using the above inequality and (3.19) in (3.18).
In order to complete the proof we need to establish the statements in Steps 1, 3 and 4.
Proof of Step 1. Let t be given. Let F t denote the event {Ψ s ∈ (0, ρ), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. We have
Denote S u = inf{s : µ s > u}, where we recall that the infimum over an empty set is taken to be ∞. Let κ ∈ (0, 1/16). Then where H is a standard Brownian motion (in particular, H s = M Ss for s < µ t ), P t is a process that satisfies P s − P u ≤ ε, u ≤ s, and H s = Ψ 0 + H s + 3rs. On the event indicated in the last line of (3.21), one has, for every integer k < κt, that H k − H k−1 ≥ −2. Hence the r.h.s. of (3.21) can be estimated by m 1 e −m 2 κt , for some positive constants m 1 and m 2 , independent of t and κ, ε, and as a result,
Next, on the event
where we assumed without loss that 2κ+16ψ
where we used µ t ≤ κt ≤ t. Using (3.16), on this event we have 0
Hence recalling that Q t ≤ ε and Ψ 0 ≤ ψ 1,∞ ε, denoting m 0 = ψ 1,∞ + 1, and letting γ be the (t-dependent) stopping time γ = inf{s : µ s > κt}, we have, for t ≥ r −1 m 0 ε,
(3.23)
In the second inequality above we used the fact that µ t ≤ κt implies γ ≥ t, and in the third we used Burkholder's inequality. In particular, m 3 does not depend on t or κ (which will allow us to use this estimate more efficiently in Step 3 below). Combining (3.20), (3.21) and (3.23) we obtain the statement in Step 1.
Proof of Step 3. We begin by observing that, from (3.21),
and since Ψ 0 + P s ≤ m 0 ε, this probability is bounded by
The latter converges to zero as ε → 0 (for fixed κ and t). Letθ be a modulus such that p(ε,θ(ε)) ≤θ(ε), and 1 2θ (ε) 1/4 ≥ m 0 ε. Taking t = r −1 (θ(ε)) 1/4 and κ = rθ(ε) 3/4 , combining (3.23) and (3.24),
Using the above estimate in (3.20), Step 3 follows.
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which follows from (3.16), (3.17) , the relation H s = Ψ 0 +M Ss +3rµ Ss for all s < µ ∞ ≡ sup t≥0 µ t and observing that on the set where σ 0 = sup{S s : s < µ ∞ } < ∞ we have that M t + 3rµ t = M σ 0 + 3rµ σ 0 , for t ≥ σ 0 .
Analysis of the game with bounded controls
The main result of this section, Theorem 4.1, implies Lemma 2.3. Fix k, l such that min{k, l} ≥ max{c 0 , d 0 , k n 2 , l n 2 }, where n 2 is as in Theorem 3.1. Throughout this section, (k, l) will be omitted from the notation. As in the previous section, only simple controls and strategies will be used. Recall that
Fix γ ∈ [0, 1) and write
and consider the equations
(4.1)
(4.2)
We will write V γ and, respectively, U γ for the functions V The proof of the theorem is based on a result on a finite time horizon, Proposition 4.1, in which we adopt a technique of [11] . Given a function u ∈ C(G), x 0 ∈ G, T ≥ 0, and
l be equal to Z on [0, T ), and let it assume the constant value (a 0 , 1) on [T, ∞). Clearly j(T,Ẑ) = j(T, Z). Also, by Lemma 3.1, denotingτ = τ x 0 (α,Ẑ), we have
for some constant m 2 independent of ε and T . By (4.3), (4.8) , definition of the payoff and using the boundary condition u| ∂G = g, we have for some m 3 ∈ (0, ∞)
Note that the infimum of j(T, Z) over M 0 l is equal to that over M (T ). Thus using (4.9) and sending ε → 0 proves that U (x 0 ) ≤ u(x 0 ).
To obtain the reverse inequality, fix x 0 ∈ G. From Lemma 3.1 there exists m 5 < ∞ and
Clearly, for each α, the infimum of J x 0 (α, Z) over all Z ∈ M 0 l is equal to that over Z ∈ N (α). Hence
Using the positive lower bound on h as before, it follows that there exists a function r : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) with lim T →∞ r(T ) = 0, such that for every α and Z ∈ N (α) we have P (τ x 0 (α, Z) > T ) ≤ r(T ). Therefore for some m 6 ∈ (0, ∞)
In conjunction with Proposition 4.1(i), this shows that U (x 0 ) ≥ u(x 0 ) − m 6 r(T ). Since T is arbitrary, we obtain U (x 0 ) ≥ u(x 0 ).
Finally we argue existence of solutions to equation (4.1). Let us write (4.1) γ for equation (4.1) with a specific γ. For γ ∈ (0, 1), existence of solutions to (4.1) γ follows from Theorem 1.1 of [4] . To handle the case γ = 0, we will use the fact that any uniform limit, as γ → 0, of solutions to (4.1) γ is a solution to (4.1) 0 . This fact follows by a standard argument, that we omit. Now, since for γ ∈ (0, 1) we have existence, the uniqueness statement established above shows that U γ solves (4.1) γ . From Theorem 3.1 we have that the family {U γ , γ ∈ (0, 1)} is equicontinuous, and thus a uniform limit of solutions, and in turn a solution to (4.1) 0 , exists.
In rest of this section we prove Proposition 4.1.
Let G n be a sequence of domains compactly contained in G and increasing to G. Let J γ n be defined as J γ of (4.3), with τ γ = τ γ (x 0 , Y, Z) replaced by τ γ n = τ γ n (x 0 , Y, Z), where 
We will prove the lemma for n = 0. Since the claim is trivial if x 0 ∈ G 0 , assume x 0 ∈ G 0 . In this proof only, write τ for τ γ 0 , the exit time of X γ from G 0 . Fix γ > γ, letτ = τγ 1 and σ = τ ∧τ . For ε > 0 consider the sup convolution
where, in the above equation only, u is extended to R m by setting u = 0 outside G. It is easy to see that there exists ε 0 such that the supremum is attained inside G for all (x, ε) ∈ G 2 × (0, ε 0 ). The standard mollification u δ ε : G 1 → R of u ε : G 2 → R is well defined, provided that δ is sufficiently small. The result [11, Lemma 2.3] for the smooth function u δ ε and the argument in the proof of [11, Theorem 2.1] show
where lim ε→0 limγ →γ lim δ→0 ρ(ε, δ, γ,γ) = 0. We remark here that Lemma 2.3 of [11] is written for the case where u is a subsolution of a PDE of the form (4.1) on all of R m and T ∧ σ is replaced by T , however the proof with u and T ∧ σ as in the current setting can be carried out in exactly the same way. Since G 0 is compactly contained in G 1 , we have that for every θ > 0
converges to 0 asγ → γ. Moreover, u δ ε → u ε as δ → 0 and u ε → u as ε → 0, where in both cases, the convergence is uniform on G 0 (see ibid.). Hence the result follows on taking δ → 0, thenγ → γ, and finally ε → 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The main argument is similar to that of Theorem 2.1, and so we omit some of the details. We will prove only item (iv) of the proposition, since the other items can be proved in a similar way. Fix x and T . Let u be a supersolution of (4.2). Let n be large enough so that dist(∂G n , ∂G) <
. Below we will keep γ in the notation only if there is scope for confusion. By Lemma 4.1, u(x) ≥ v n := inf β sup Y j n (Y, β), for every n. We need to show u(x) ≥ v := inf β sup Y j(Y, β). 
with probability tending to 1 as n → ∞. It now follows from the definition of J n and J (cf. (4.3)) that lim sup n δ n ≤ ρ(ε) for some modulus ρ. Since ε is arbitrary, this proves the result.
Remarks on optimal solution trajectories
Recall from (2.1) that
and denote
(compare with (2.2)-(2.3)). The following proposition is a consequence of Lemma 2.1. The result states that for the SDG of Section 1.2, the associated Isaacs condition, Λ + = Λ − , holds. Although we do not make use of this observation in our proofs (except in Proposition 5.2 below), such a condition is often invoked in studies of games in showing that the game has a value (cf. [6] , [11] ).
Proof. We will only show Λ − = Λ (the proof of Λ + = Λ being similar). Fix p, S, and omit them from the notation. Write H k for {(a, c) ∈ H : c ≤ k} and φ(y, z) for Φ(a, b, c, d), where
Thus by Lemma 2.1, Λ − ≥ Λ.
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Note that b δ must converge to −p or else the middle inequality above will say Λ − = −∞, contradicting the bound Λ − ≥ Λ. Letting δ → 0, we now have from the third inequality that Λ − ≤ Λ. The result follows.
In [9] the authors raise questions and state partial results about the form of the limit trajectory under optimal play of the Tug-of-War game, as the step size approaches zero (see Section 7 therein). It is natural to ask, similarly, whether one can characterize (near) optimal trajectories for the SDG studied in the current paper. Our aim in the following discussion is only to present the main idea for such an analysis; the precise argument is work in progress.
Let V be as given in (1.10). Given δ > 0, let β δ ∈ Γ be a δ-optimal strategy, and let Y δ ∈ M be a δ-optimal control for playing against β δ . One may ask whether the law of the process X δ , under (β δ , Y δ ), converges to a limit law as δ → 0; whether this limit law is the same for any choice of such (β δ , Y δ ) pairs; and finally, whether an explicit characterization of this limit law can be provided. A somewhat less ambitious goal, that we will discuss here, is to ask whether there exists some choice of δ-optimal (β δ , Y δ ) such that the limit law for the corresponding X δ exists and can be characterized in a simple manner.
The sketch that we present below aims at showing that this question can be reduced to the understanding of much simpler objects, namely Λ + and Λ − of (5.2), (5.3), which represent the values of a 'static game'.
A basic assumption will be that V is a C 2 (Ḡ) function, with nonvanishing gradient inḠ. A similar assumption is made in Section 7 of [9] . Under this assumption, by an application of Itô's formula to V (X) and noting that g(X τ ) = V (X τ ), the cost function J in (1.9) can be written as Assuming that this equation has a unique solution (which is a question on whether 'nice' selection z δ exists), this defines Z δ = (b δ (X), d δ (X)), and hence the strategy β δ .
We claim that β δ is cδ-optimal, for some constant c ∈ (0, ∞), namely, J(x, Y, β δ [Y ]) ≤ V (x) + cδ for all Y ∈ M . We do not prove the claim here, however note that for every s, we have ψ(X s , Y s , z δ (X s )) ≥ −δ, and thus E − and setting Y δ = (a δ (X), c δ (X)). Once more, additional properties of the selection y δ , z δ are needed in order to ensure existence of solutions.
We next claim that Y δ is cδ-optimal for playing against β δ for some c ∈ (0, ∞), namely, V (x) − cδ ≤ J(x, Y δ , β δ [Y δ ]) ≤ V (x) + cδ. Since ψ(X s , Y s , β[Y ] s ) ≤ δ for all s, the proof of the above claim, that is omitted here, will be similar to the one for the cδ optimality of β δ .
Thus one can interpret X δ that is obtained by solving (5.10) as a cδ-optimal trajectory associated with the SDG. One would like to take δ → 0 and characterize the limits of X δ . This question regards the limit of the functions y δ and z δ of (5.7) and (5.9) .
In what follows, we will suppress x from notation in y δ (x), z δ (x) etc. We denote D 2 V (x) by S.
Proposition 5.2. Let q = 2 |p| 2 (Sp − p, Sp p) (note that p · q = 0). Then on a sequence δ n → 0, P δn → 2p and Q δn → q pointwise.
From (5.10) and (5.11), this leads to the following form for the limit trajectory, dX = 2p(X)dW + q(X)ds. This is precisely the form of the limit trajectory conjectured for the Tug-of-War game, as the step size approaches 0, in [9] .
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 2.1 we see that as δ → 0, a δ →p. In particular
We now consider the limiting behavior of
Write a δ as a δ = (1 − θ It is easy to see thatΦ δ (θ δ , η δ ) = Φ(y δ , z δ ). We will assume, without loss of generality, that (θ δ , η δ ) ∈ arg min (θ,η)∈S {Φ δ (θ, η)}. Define for (θ, η) ∈ S, Ψ(θ, η) = at which η ′ Sp is maximized. Now suppose that as θ → 0, η * (θ) → η * (along some subsequence). Since Ψ(θ, η * (θ)) ≥ Ψ(θ,q), we have on taking limit as θ → 0, (η * ) ′ Sp ≥q ′ Sp. The claim follows.
Let for θ ∈ [0, 1], H(θ) = Ψ(η * (θ), θ) and define
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We This shows (5.12). Next, suppressing δ, by the Lagrange multipliers theorem, Dφ(a) = λa for some λ ∈ R, where φ(a) = Φ(a, −p, 0, d; p, S). Thus −S(a +p) − dp = λa, and
Since a →p, the first term converges to zero using (5.12), whereas the sum of the last two terms converges to q.
